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Building Participatory Organizations for Common Pool
Resource Management: Water User Group Promotion in Indonesia
JACOB I. RICKS*
Singapore Management University, Singapore
Summary.— States are increasingly striving to create participatory local organizations for joint management of common pool resources.
What local conditions determine success of such state eﬀorts? What eﬀect do these eﬀorts have? Drawing on controlled comparisons
between three districts in Indonesia and an original survey of 92 water user groups, I demonstrate that local political contexts condition
the eﬀectiveness of participatory irrigation policies. When irrigation is politically salient, local politicians pressure bureaucrats to better
engage with farmers. The data also show that training programs are not as eﬀective at increasing water user organization activity as
frequent contact between bureaucrats and farmers.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, a growing body of research has emphasized
the capacity of local organizations to manage common pool
resources through collective action (Bardhan, 1993b;
Ostrom, 1990, 2000; Ostrom & Gardner, 1993; Wade, 1987).
In this work is an implicit, and sometimes explicit, critique
of state eﬀorts to control resource management. State control,
or even interference, often eviscerates the institutions for col-
lective action which have evolved over generations to deal with
challenges in their environments (Agrawal & Chhatre, 2007;
Ostrom, 2005).
This extremely valuable literature often implies a dichotomy
between local organizations and a hierarchical centralized
state, at times employing empirical tests contrasting the eﬀec-
tiveness of the two (e.g., Lam, 1998). Framing the world in this
way, though, glosses over the fact that many common pool
resource systems are jointly managed (Agrawal & Benson,
2011). In most countries, state policies are involved more than
ever in common pool resources, often through participatory
methods incorporating citizen groups (Agrawal, 2007). Rather
than having either independent groups or state agencies indi-
vidually manage resources, we instead see state actors promot-
ing local organizations to accomplish developmental tasks in
close collaboration with the state (e.g., Barr, Dekker, &
Fafchamps, 2015; Edmonds, 2002). Often these organizations
are products of top-down state policies rather than bottom-up
collaboration among resource users. The questions then arise,
under what conditions do these policies result in the creation
and encouragement of eﬀective participatory organizations?
What eﬀect do state eﬀorts have?
These questions have broad-ranging relevance, from ﬁsh-
eries to farming villages to forest communities. As developing
countries adopt participatory policies, often spurred by the
international aid community, it is of vital interest to under-
stand the local conditions that facilitate implementation of
these policies and the eﬀect of eﬀorts to incorporate service
recipient participation (Mansuri & Rao, 2013). In this essay,
I examine these questions through investigating attempts by
the Indonesian state to develop water user associations
(WUA) to assist in the operation and maintenance of irriga-
tion systems.
Irrigation has long held a privileged place in discussions of
participatory management of common pool resources (Lam,
1996; Moore, 1989; Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Wade, 1987), and
Southeast Asian cases have ﬁgured prominently in the
discussion, both for their successes and challenges (Araral,
2005, 2009, 2011; Bruns, 1993; Fujiie, Hayami, & Kikuchi,
2005; Korten & Siy, 1989; Ricks, 2015; Svendsen, 1993;
Vermillion, Samad, Pusposudardjo, Arif, & Rochdyanto,
2000). Recently, scholars focused on Indonesia have begun
to analyze the national politics that shape irrigation policies
(Bruns, 2004, 2013; Suhardiman, 2013, 2015; Suhardiman &
Mollinga, 2012), an area of research often overlooked in ear-
lier analyses (Mollinga & Bolding, 2004; Suhardiman,
Giordano, Rap, & Wegerich, 2014). Synthesizing and building
upon this work, Suhardiman and Giordano (2014) came to the
conclusion that greater policy emphasis must be placed on
farmer–agency interactions, suggesting that a sub-national
focus on the farmer–agency relationship might provide better
results than previous eﬀorts to engage national-level policy
(Oorthuizen, 2003; van der Zaag, 1992). Through a better
understanding of local-level interactions, the goals of
participatory irrigation management may be achieved.
Expanding on this point, I contend that the local political
environment shapes implementation of participatory policies
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for resource management. Using a controlled comparison
research design of three districts in Indonesia, I show that
the success of state eﬀorts to promote WUA was determined
by the relationship between irrigation oﬃcials and farmers,
which was contingent upon the political context of the district
(von Luebke, 2009). Only when irrigation was an important
political issue did the district leadership obligate bureaucrats
to promote farmer participation. Thus, I underscore the vital
role of local governments in shaping the incentive structure
of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010).
Further emphasizing the impact of interaction between oﬃ-
cials and farmers, I present a second ﬁnding drawn from an
original survey of 92 WUA. Here I demonstrate that training
programs, although yielding some beneﬁts, often fall short in
their goal of promoting participation. Indeed, short-term
or temporary training programs may even be counter-
productive to institutional development and building a partic-
ipatory relationship between state actors and farmers. The
data show WUA activity was most strongly aﬀected instead
by the frequency of interaction between state oﬃcials and
group leaders.
These ﬁndings emphasize the importance of local political
contexts in determining the implementation of participatory
policies. Successful outcomes in co-production of services
require that bureaucrats and farmer groups develop the capac-
ity to collaborate in joint management of resources (Evans,
1995, 1996; Lam, 1996; Ostrom, 1996), but decisions about
policy made by centralized agencies are unlikely to succeed
in this endeavor (Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004; Suhardiman
& Giordano, 2014). Citizen demands translated through local
politics, though, can encourage the development of participa-
tory organizations and a collaborative relationship between
state actors and service recipients.
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, I provide a brief overview of some of the obstacles
states face when promoting participatory organizations and
hypothesize how these might be overcome at the local level.
Section 3 provides background on the Indonesian policy con-
text. I then describe my research methods and data collection
strategy in Section 4 before turning to my qualitative compar-
isons across three districts in Yogyakarta in Section 5 and pre-
senting the results of the WUA survey in Section 6. In the
conclusion, I discuss the implications of these ﬁndings.
2. POLITICS, BUREAUCRATS, AND PARTICIPATORY
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
Building local organizations necessary for participatory
management of common pool resources is a complex develop-
mental task. While researchers have identiﬁed some of the
conditions and principles necessary for such groups
(Agrawal, 2003; Araral, 2009; Ostrom, 1992), these
approaches can neglect the politics that shape state actions
regarding participatory organizations (Mollinga, 2008;
Mollinga & Bolding, 2004). In this section I ﬁrst brieﬂy
describe the challenges states face in building participatory
organizations. This highlights the vital role of bureaucracies
and especially street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010;
Suhardiman & Giordano, 2014; Wade, 1992). I then argue
the relevance of local political contexts in shaping the incen-
tive structures of oﬃcials who implement participatory poli-
cies.
Participatory organizations are diﬃcult for states to build
because they run contrary to the incentive structure and orga-
nizational culture of centralized bureaucracies (Grindle, 1997;
Quarles van Uﬀord, 1988; Scott, 1998). This is especially true
of irrigation agencies, which often adopt a ‘‘hydraulic mis-
sion” or bureaucratic identity prioritizing large infrastructure
projects rather than reforms necessary for participatory man-
agement (Molle, Mollinga, & Wester, 2009; Suhardiman &
Giordano, 2014; Suhardiman et al., 2014). Thus when state
oﬃcials are charged with forming a participatory organiza-
tion, implementation fails for a number of reasons including
poor alignment with bureaucratic goals, high information
and transaction costs, and the diﬃculty of measuring partici-
patory outcomes (Lam, 1998; Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004;
Ricks, 2015; Suhardiman, 2013, 2015). Thus, it should be
unsurprising when state eﬀorts to develop WUA fall short of
expectations. In fact, we should anticipate ﬁnding more failed
groups than successful ones.
Even so, we have examples in which state actors do coordi-
nate and cooperate with farmer groups. Lam (1996, 2001)
demonstrates that eﬀective WUA in Taiwan emerged from a
unique institutional milieu in which local irrigation oﬃcials
have strong incentives to work closely with farmers. Oﬃcials
live in the communities they serve, they face community pres-
sure, and they interact daily with the farmers who use irriga-
tion. This social embeddedness of oﬃcials contributes to the
strength and eﬀectiveness of the organizations (see also
Evans, 1995; Moore, 1989). Tendler (1997) found similar out-
comes among extension agents in Brazil wherein the oﬃcials’
performance was conditioned on their relationship with ser-
vice recipients. Street-level bureaucrats that develop a rapport
with those they serve produce better policy outcomes because
their implementation eﬀorts are better directed at the local
needs (Oorthuizen, 2003; van der Zaag, 1992; Wade, 1992).
Thus, if farmer–agency interface is so important
(Suhardiman & Giordano, 2014), what conditions create
incentives for street-level bureaucrats to develop close rela-
tionships with service recipients? Here I suggest that we must
pay closer attention to the role of politicians. While bureau-
cracies can, at times, have independent missions and interests,
their ultimate incentive structures are set by politicians who
control the purse strings (Huber & Shipan, 2002). Drawing
again on the ﬁndings of Tendler (1997), the eﬀectiveness of
civil servants arose not only from their relationship with ser-
vice recipients; it was also conditioned on the incentives, pres-
sures, and praise they received from politicians (Lipsky, 2010;
McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1989; Moe, 1984).
Politicians, though, react to their own incentive structure.
Their main motivation is to remain in oﬃce, but being a polit-
ical leader is time-consuming. They cannot address all policy
issues that require attention. Thus they will react most
strongly and quickly to those policy issues that can threaten
their tenure; otherwise they often allow the status quo
bureaucracy to deal with policy issues as they appear (Besley
& Burgess, 2002; Grindle & Thomas, 1991). In other
words, demand-side constraints shape their incentives
(Winters, Karim, & Martawardaya, 2014). Following this
logic, I propose that when irrigation becomes salient to a
politician’s success, he or she will exert control over the irriga-
tion agency, incentivizing oﬃcials to engage more closely with
farmers. This, in turn, should lead to better participatory
outcomes.
Such pressures should be much more salient at the local
level. A focus on irrigation is rarely a nationwide political
strategy, 1 but locally it can be very important. Proponents
of decentralization have argued that by bringing governance
decisions closer to the people, service provision will
improve through increased accountability and responsiveness
(Bardhan, 2002; Diamond, 1999; Faguet, 2004). Thus
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subnational discrepancies can be explained by variation in
political prominence of irrigation.
In sum, in countries that have already adopted participatory
policies, I hypothesize that two issues are ultimately salient in
the implementation of those policies. First, the relationship
between bureaucrats and service recipients will determine the
eﬃcacy of participatory groups (Suhardiman & Giordano,
2014). If bureaucrats are aloof outsiders who are merely imple-
menting top-down policies, we should expect to see paper
organizations with little eﬀect. On the other hand, if bureau-
crats develop close and enduring relationships with farmers,
then we will see more eﬀective WUA emerge.
Second, the local political context should shape the incen-
tives of bureaucrats. In areas where political pressure for irri-
gation management reaches politicians, those political leaders
will wield their inﬂuence to pressure bureaucrats to work more
closely with farmers. This should lead to better participatory
outcomes. Alternatively, where irrigation is not politically sali-
ent, we should see the bureaucracy being left to its own inter-
nal incentive structure.
Indonesia provides an excellent opportunity to test these
two propositions. Due to massive decentralization during its
democratic transition, individual districts exercise extensive
control over both policy implementation and budgets
(Sjahrir, Kis-Kasot, & Shulze, 2014). 2 Variation between dis-
tricts grants the opportunity to seek out successful cases and
compare them with relatively less successful cases while hold-
ing a variety of variables constant. In the next section I
describe the Indonesian policy context before progressing to
my research design.
3. THE INDONESIAN POLICY CONTEXT
Scholars working on Indonesia have emphasized the politics
of national water policies, especially those regarding participa-
tory irrigation management (Bruns, 2004; Lansing, 2007;
Suhardiman, 2013, 2015; Suhardiman & Mollinga, 2012).
My own analysis, though, focuses on the local level, treating
this national policy environment as exogenous. Thus I only
provide a few brief details here about national policies to clar-
ify the context in which my research took place.
Indonesia’s current WUA framework is largely drawn from
the 1987 Irrigation Operation and Maintenance Policy, which
emerged out of international donor pressure in the wake of the
1980s oil crisis (Bruns, 2004). In accordance with the policy,
three types of WUA exist, which operate in similar fashion
albeit at diﬀerent canal levels. At the tertiary canal are the
basic water user groups, or perkumpulan petani pemakai air
commonly called P3A. Membership ranges from only a few
to a few hundred farmers, according to canal length, popula-
tion density, and area watered. At the secondary canal level, a
group of P3A can combine to become an Integrated Water
User Group, or gabungan P3A or GP3A. These generally
include thousands of farmers. Finally, at the primary canal
level, a group of GP3A can join together to become a Major
Water User Group, induk P3A or IP3A. They are rare,
though.
Ideally, WUA should have responsibility over operating and
maintaining the irrigation systems in their territory. In reality,
throughout much of its history, the irrigation agency limited
the role of farmers; they were expected to provide labor for
projects and pay water user fees to the irrigation agency but
little else.
This changed in response to the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis.
Indonesia embarked on a massive and tumultuous transition,
encompassing both democratization and decentralization.
Political and administrative authority was handed to districts,
giving them a great deal of autonomy in policy development
and implementation. At the same time, the government was
forced to rely heavily on loans from international agencies in
order to pay its bills. The agricultural sector depended on a
package of loans from the World Bank, supported by other
international donors, called the Water Sector Adjustment
Loan (WATSAL). This program mandated that the Indone-
sian government engage in greater transfer of authority over
irrigation systems to farmer participants. This resulted in a
number of policies which expanded the role of WUA. They
were assigned real responsibility over operating and maintain-
ing their systems.
As implementation proceeded, though, forces in Jakarta
were working to return control of irrigation systems nation-
wide back to the central government ministries (see
Suhardiman, 2015). This resulted in the 2004 Law on Water
Resources (UU No. 7, 2004). 3 The new law, and the succes-
sive Presidential Instructions, returned the bulk of control
over irrigation management to the hands of the bureaucracy,
reversing many of the participatory eﬀorts enacted from
2000 through 2006. Shortly thereafter, in 2008, another new
law transferred authority over the basic water user groups
(P3A) to the Ministry of Agriculture, while the irrigation
agency within the Ministry of Public Works maintained
authority over Integrated and Major Water User Groups
(GP3A and IP3A). This created the administrative and politi-
cal environment wherein the data presented here were col-
lected.
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION
During the WATSAL program and the Water and Irriga-
tion Sector Management Program (WISMP) which followed,
World Bank evaluations gauged the success of the participa-
tory policies throughout the provinces sharing in the projects.
When the ﬁrst phase of the WISMP loan ended in 2011, the
program was evaluated prior to the disbursement of the sec-
ond tranche of the loan. 4 While the World Bank chose not
to delay the program’s second phase, a Ministry of Public
Works Oﬃcial explained that only two of the participating
provinces had achieved necessary outcomes for advancement
to the second stage of the loan program (personal communica-
tion, Yogyakarta, June 13, 2011). One of these was Yogya-
karta Special Administrative Region; the other was Nusa
Tenggara Barat. This indicated that Yogyakarta had achieved
some level of success at meeting the program goals, including
improved institutional capacity among water user groups.
Even so, within Yogyakarta, diﬀerent districts experienced
variation in their success at promoting WUA. This provides
an important methodological opportunity to investigate the
research questions posed above. First, I conducted a compar-
ative case design, implementing controlled comparisons of
three districts within Yogyakarta. Thanks to similarities
across the three districts, I was able to hold many variables
constant while observing variation in the success of WUA pro-
motion (Slater & Ziblatt, 2013). This allowed me to address
the proposition that local political context should shape the
implementation of participatory policies.
Second, seeking to better understand the eﬀect of state
eﬀorts to promote WUA, I conducted a survey within a single
district. P3A organizations from Sleman district have experi-
enced uncommon success in recent years. Indonesia holds a
yearly competition both to reward and encourage WUA to
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develop their capacity to accomplish collective action. In these
yearly competitions, basic water user groups from the Sleman
district are considered as some of the country’s top
performers. This evidenced either some degree of excellence
in the training program or some special characteristic unique
to Sleman’s water user groups. Initial research had indicated
that it was due to training eﬀorts of the irrigation agency
(Ricks & Arif, 2012). Thus, I developed the survey to better
understand how the relationship between irrigation oﬃcials
and farmers determined WUA activity.
The data for this study were gathered in two phases. Phase I,
carried out from January through October 2011, was primarily
qualitative in nature. I accessed primary data by visiting local
government oﬃces, observing meetings of both government
oﬃcials and WUA, accompanying the evaluation committee
for the annual WUA competition, and visiting with leaders
of farmer groups. I also conducted over 70 semi-structured
interviews with farmer leaders, government oﬃcials, and
researchers. Contacts were initially drawn from snowballing
methods beginning with local researchers, then spreading into
local government agencies, and ﬁnally meeting with leaders of
both successful and unsuccessful farmer organizations.
Interviews with farmer leaders discussed aspects of WUA
activity, including farmer organization, operations and main-
tenance of canals, as well as basic information about the
group. Further questions addressed the history of the group
and its relationship with the irrigation and agriculture agen-
cies. I asked farmer leaders to oﬀer their own explanations
of group success or failure. Interviews with government oﬃ-
cials included requests to identify successful groups, explain
their own deﬁnitions of success, and describe their own inter-
action with WUA. I also asked questions regarding the history
of the district agencies’ interaction with farmers and the eﬀect
of policy changes. Discussions with government oﬃcials often
involved evaluations of a number of groups as well as deeper
exchanges regarding bureaucratic incentives, agency eﬀorts to
work with WUA, and oﬃcials’ own experiences regarding
farmer groups. Interviews with local researchers focused pri-
marily on attaining understanding of the local context, includ-
ing history of the bureaucratic agencies in the region. In all
cases, the semi-structured nature of the interview allowed
respondents to answer questions broadly and direct the con-
versation toward the aspects of irrigation management and
farmer–agency cooperation that they felt were most impor-
tant.
Phase II included a face-to-face survey drawing on the les-
sons learned from the earlier qualitative work. Using data
from the district irrigation and agriculture agencies, I identi-
ﬁed 441 basic water user groups (P3A) in Sleman District.
Of these, I used proportional quota sampling to choose 100
groups, drawing a representative number from each subdis-
trict. In cases where the chosen group was unavailable, the
most proximate P3A group was substituted. From the process,
92 valid surveys were completed from October 2013 through
early 2014.
Because the survey relied on responses from farmer leaders,
I oversampled ‘‘active” groups. While this choice would be
detrimental to a study seeking to abide the assumptions of
probability sampling, for my purposes this is less troubling
for two reasons. First, in order to obtain information about
the groups, I needed to be able to contact farmers who could
comment on the group’s status. If a group was completely
inactive and no farmer leader was available to survey, includ-
ing that group in the sample would have been futile. Second,
while the sampling framework limits the conclusions I can
draw about the broader population of water user groups, it
does give suﬃcient variation between groups which had been
trained by the irrigation department (54 valid responses) and
those which had not been trained (31 valid responses). A smal-
ler proportion reported having taken part in a recent training
program, which had been more clearly geared toward WUA
promotion (35 valid responses). Thus the survey data allow
me to draw conclusions about the eﬀect of state eﬀorts to pro-
mote these groups.
5. DISTRICT COMPARISONS
In this section I address the ﬁrst question posed in the intro-
duction: under what conditions do participatory policies result
in the creation and encouragement of eﬀective participatory
organizations? I do this by comparing the success of WUA
promotion strategies across three districts in Yogyakarta:
Bantul, Kulon Progo, and Sleman. Thus, my unit of analysis
is the district. First I deﬁne my dependent variable and explain
how I measured it. I then evaluate ﬁve alternate explanations
for the observed variation in success before turning to the role
of local politics and discussing my ﬁndings.
(a) Measuring the dependent variable
The dependent variable is each district’s degree of success in
promoting WUA, measured by the proportion of WUA in the
district which are considered eﬀective. Unfortunately the
Indonesian irrigation agency does not keep standardized
assessments of the organizations. 5 While the central irrigation
agency does request that local oﬃces conduct evaluations each
year as part of the annual WUA contest, local irrigation oﬃ-
cials do not have time, will, or resources to appraise each unit.
With even a small district containing hundreds of P3A groups,
evaluations are often limited to local oﬃcials’ subjective obser-
vations.
Conscious of these constraints, I judged WUA eﬀectiveness
on four indicators drawn from literature on irrigation manage-
ment (Garces-Restrepo, Vermillion, &Munoz, 2007; Mukherji
et al., 2009). The four indicators included: (1) ability of the
groups to independently collect water user fees; (2) ability of
groups to manage conﬂicts between farmers without reliance
on government oﬃcials; (3) ability of groups to manage water
distribution independently; and (4) the relationship of groups
with the irrigation agency. Each of the ﬁrst three indicators
highlights an aspect of WUA organizational strength. I chose
these indicators as they were relatively easily observable in a
data-poor environment in comparison to some other possible
indicators. For instance, oﬃcials and farmers could accurately
comment on whether or not any water conﬂict within a group
had been referred to irrigation oﬃcials or the local govern-
ment within the past few years. In contrast, equitable distribu-
tion of water, another possible indicator, would rely on
subjective evaluations due to the absence of clear monitoring
data. Thus I chose to focus primarily on indicators which
reduced the chance that evaluations would be subject to
respondent bias.
The fourth indicator, the relationship of WUA with the irri-
gation agency, was designed to gauge the capacity for cooper-
ation between state oﬃcials and farmer groups. As such, it
relied on subjective evaluations from irrigation oﬃcials, agri-
culture agency oﬃcials, researchers, and farmer group leaders.
Generally I found that this evaluation, at least on the district
level, was consistent across all of my respondent groups. The
only exceptions came from a few government oﬃcials
who would oﬀer a pronouncement that farmers and the
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government worked well together, but upon further question-
ing most would admit they had painted too rosy a picture.
District irrigation and agriculture oﬃcials provided initial
evaluations of the eﬃcacy of WUA in their respective districts
based on these four characteristics. The perspective of district
oﬃcials was supplemented by evaluations from local research-
ers at Gadjah Mada University who have a long history of
collaboration with the irrigation agency and promoting farmer
welfare in the province. Beyond this, my own ﬁeld visits and
discussions with WUA leaders in all three districts informed
my evaluation of success.
The three districts demonstrated a range of variation in
these evaluations. WUA in Kulon Progo were relatively suc-
cessful. Oﬃcials, researchers, and farmer leaders felt that all
of the 10 GP3A could be considered eﬀective, and many of
the 240 P3A were also active. 6 I rank Kulon Progo, then, as
mostly successful. Bantul, on the other hand, is home to 35
GP3A units and 313 P3A units, but very few of them are
eﬀective along my measures. Thus Bantul is considered mostly
unsuccessful at promoting WUA. Sleman experiences limited
success. By and large, the 24 GP3A are not considered active.
In contrast, the district has been repeatedly recognized in
provincial and national contests as home to some of the most
successful P3A in the country. That said, the successful groups
are relatively few and have all taken part in recent training
programs from the district irrigation agency; the vast majority
of the 441 P3A groups are not considered active.
Thus we see three levels of success in participatory policy
implementation within the same province: Kulon Progo as
mostly successful; Bantul as mostly unsuccessful; and Sleman
as experiencing limited success. 7 Before discussing ﬁndings
about the eﬀect of the local political context on this variation,
my comparative research design allows me to preclude ﬁve
possible alternative explanations.
(b) Alternative explanations
First, many scholars have argued that collective action is
shaped by resource system characteristics (Agrawal, 2002;
Bardhan, 1993a; Uphoﬀ, Wickramasinghe, & Wijayaratna,
1990). Among the most important factors for irrigation is
location. Upstream users who have plentiful access to water
generally ﬁnd that collective action in resource management
is not necessary. Downstream users, on the other hand, are
compelled to activity in order to ensure their access to water
(see Ostrom, 1990). Thus we might expect to see greater suc-
cess in our two downstream districts, Bantul and Kulon
Progo. In contrast, we see that one is successful, which the
other is not. The upstream district, Sleman, on the other hand,
experiences limited success. Thus the upstream–downstream
dichotomy fails to adequately explain this variation.
Second, group size and clearly deﬁned boundaries also
shape the ability of groups to be successful (Fujiie et al.,
2005; Olson, 1965; Tang, 1992). In general, though, these char-
acteristics are held constant among the three districts. Basic
P3A can range from fewer than 10 members covering less than
ﬁve hectares to over 600 members with a range of almost 200
hectares. Group size in each district is fairly uniform. In Ban-
tul the average P3A covers 52 hectares, in Sleman the average
area is 43 hectares, and in Kulon Progo the average area is just
under 45 hectares. Boundaries between groups are also porous
in all districts. Thus group size and boundaries fail to clearly
explain the variation.
Third, the underlying assumption of neo-institutional eco-
nomics is that scarcity drives institutional change (North,
1995), thus scarcity of resources, especially in the irrigation
agency, could be seen as an opportunity for irrigation oﬃcials
to focus on building farmer capacity to manage irrigation.
Multiple irrigation oﬃcials in all three districts argued that
promotion of WUA emerged due to manpower shortages
rather than any speciﬁc government policy push. Due to bud-
get constraints, Indonesia’s civil service was under a hiring
freeze from 2011 to 2013. Limits on hiring in the irrigation
agency, though, predate the freeze.
Potentially this could explain the variation in WUA promo-
tion across the districts if discrepancies in the shortages corre-
sponded with the dependent variable. This is not the case.
According to oﬃcials, all three districts suﬀer from manpower
shortages. Kulon Progo’s irrigation oﬃce has seen a drop in
the number of oﬃcials, most dramatically in ﬁeld oﬃcers (juru
air) from 33 to only ﬁve. This has translated into greater reli-
ance on WUA and collaboration between the agency and
farmer groups (irrigation oﬃcial, personal communication,
Kulon Progo, July 28, 2011). Bantul’s irrigation oﬃce faced
a similar drop in the number of irrigation workers. While oﬃ-
cials complain of the shortage, it has not translated into
greater emphasis on promoting WUA (irrigation oﬃcials, per-
sonal communication, Bantul, February 25, 2011). Sleman
faced similar constraints. In 2010, the Department of Water,
Energy, and Mineral Resources that houses the irrigation
agency had 192 employees, but more than half of them were
over 50 years old and rapidly approaching mandatory retire-
ment. Only 36 were under 39 years of age. In response, one
oﬃcial created a WUA training program, but his eﬀorts were
limited due to resource constraints; only about nine P3A per
year could take part in the program (irrigation oﬃcial, per-
sonal communication, Sleman, April 7, 2011). This was, argu-
ably, the source of the district’s success in the national P3A
contests mentioned above. Unfortunately, though, the eﬀorts
did not spread throughout the district agency. Thus we see
that resource constraints were constant across all three dis-
tricts, and they alone fail to explain variation in the outcome
of interest.
Fourth, changes in government policy may shape the eﬀec-
tiveness of the WUA (Ostrom, 1992). Even so, the national
policy environment is held constant for all three districts. They
all took part in the shifts in WUA promotion which occurred
in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, including the World
Bank-funded projects. The national water laws as well as cen-
tral irrigation agency direction has been the same for all three
districts.
A ﬁfth possibility is that farmers in one district may have
higher levels of informal organization, a rough indicator of
social capital, which might be driving the observed variation
(Evans, 1996; Ostrom, 2000). In these cases, though, we are
able to hold the role of social capital relatively constant.
Scholars have repeatedly referenced Indonesian farmers’
capacity to organize for irrigation management (Bruns,
2013; Lansing, 2007). Indeed, Javanese farmers in the Yogya-
karta area have a long history of informal organization for
water management (Arif, 2009; FTP-UGM, 2006). In all three
districts, farmers episodically organized to engage in activities
like canal cleaning. This, though, did not mean that the local
WUA was active and able to facilitate cooperation with the
irrigation agency. Because this informal farmer activity, or
level of social capital, was constant across all three districts,
it also fails to explain the variation in outcomes.
These ﬁve possible explanations are summarized in
Table 1. As shown, there is no clear correlation between
any single explanation and the degree of district success in
promoting WUA. The variation in success, then, draws
from some other explanation (Slater & Ziblatt, 2013). In
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the next section I contend that it is conditioned on the local
political context.
(c) Local political context and WUA promotion
Due to Indonesia’s decentralization, district-level politicians
hold great sway over the bureaucrats charged with implement-
ing policies (Aspinall, 2014; Buehlher, 2010; von Luebke,
2009). Thus, I posit that if district politicians have strong
incentives to focus on farmers as a political constituency, then
they will exercise greater control over the irrigation agency,
prompting better service, and therefore attaining greater suc-
cess in promoting WUA.
The variation in political pressure felt by local politicians
regarding agriculture is clearly represented by the proportion
of each district’s population involved in agricultural sectors.
Table 1 presents these numbers. According to 2012 provincial
data, over half of Kulon Progo’s work force (52.56%) is
employed in agriculture (BPS, 2013). This count may underes-
timate the number of farmers, as many employees in other sec-
tors still maintain small farms. Irrigation oﬃcials in the district
claimed that over 80% of the population was involved in agri-
culture activities (irrigation oﬃcial, personal communication,
Kulon Progo, May 10, 2011). The large proportion of farmers
translates into electoral demands on district leaders. For
instance, during the 2011 election for district head, each of
the three candidates paid special focus to farmer issues. The
candidate who won the election even visited a number of
GP3A oﬃces, as some GP3A leaders also serve as vote can-
vassers.
In contrast, both Bantul and Sleman’s populations are
rapidly shifting out of agriculture. Bantul’s population is
growing, with an increase of about 100,000 residents during
2000–10, with the majority of the growth being outside the
agriculture sector. Farm land is being quickly converted from
production into housing and other urban use. The share of
agriculture in the local economy dropped from just under
24% of the district’s Gross Regional Product (GRP) in 2010
to less than 20% in 2014. Only 15.63% of the local workforce
remained primarily employed in agriculture in 2012. The dis-
trict government is focused on promoting the communication
sector, commerce, and services rather than agriculture
(BAPPEDA, 2011).
Sleman’s district government also has economic and policy
foci outside of the agriculture sector. According to recent
numbers from the Bureau of Provincial Statistics (BPS,
2013), the proportion of residents employed in the commerce
sector (25.3%) and the services sector (24.6%) are both larger
than agriculture (20.4%). Agriculture’s contribution to the
economy is slowly dropping, from 14.5% in 2006 to less than
13% in 2012. Housing Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta
State University, and 27 other institutions of higher education,
the district has a heavy focus on the education sector. The cur-
rent district chief comes from an educational background and
does not list agriculture as one of his priorities for his term
(2010–15). Instead, the district government is focused on edu-
cation, health, and creating a stronger investment climate.
In both Bantul and Sleman, the relatively weak focus on
agriculture in the economy has translated into a lack of polit-
ical will to eﬀectively promote good governance in water man-
agement and participatory programs in irrigation. Without
political constraint on local politicians, they have little incen-
tive to exercise authority over irrigation oﬃcials. Civil servants
in the irrigation agency reported feeling very little pressure
from the district government to focus on agricultural develop-
ment.
Beyond economic signals, ﬁeld interviews also indicated that
farmers in Kulon Progo were better able to access their district
government leaders than those in either Bantul or Sleman.
Kulon Progo’s bupati, or district chief, has long been inter-
ested in the needs of farmers (former irrigation oﬃcial, per-
sonal communication, Kulon Progo, August 4, 2011). Part
of this was due to the prevalence of agriculture in the local
economy, but it was also due to social connections between
the district chief and farmer groups. The chief for the two
terms prior to the 2011 election, Toyo Santoso Dipo, was
the son of farmers and lived within the boundaries of one
P3A. The head of the local GP3A had also served as a vote
canvasser, and his wife belonged to some of the same social
organizations as the district chief’s wife. Social ties gave farm-
ers direct access to the local government.
Through this informal mechanism, the farmers of the area
lobbied the district government to ask for ﬁnancial assistance
to support their GP3A organizations (farmer leader, personal
communication, Kulon Progo, August 12, 2011). In response
to the lobbying, the district government passed Peraturan
Bupati Kulon Progo, Nomor 54 Tahun 2009 (Kulon Progo Dis-
trict Chief Regulation, No. 54, 2009) which provides ﬁnancial
assistance for each GP3A in the district to the tune of ﬁve mil-
lion rupiah (approximately 500 USD) per year. While GP3A
generally rely on irrigation service fees from farmers as well
as subsidies from the irrigation agency, there are a number
of minor expenses where such funding falls short, especially
since legal changes in 2006 created challenges for the GP3A
to collect member fees (ﬁeld notes, meeting between GP3A
heads and irrigation oﬃcials, Kulon Progo, August 10,
2011). Assistance from the district government has become
an important subsidy for the costs of farmer meetings as well
as some of the expenses that leaders incur from traveling
around the association.
Beyond ﬁnancial support, the district chief also pressured
local irrigation and agriculture oﬃcials to be responsive to
farmers. At one point he was reported to have lectured civil
servants on the merits of involving farmers in their work.
Table 1. District comparisons
Location on
system
Avg. group
size* (Ha)
Agency labor
shortage*
Policy context
& social capital
Share of agriculture in
economy**
Water user associations
Labor (%) GRP (%)
Kulon Progo Downstream 45 Yes Constant 52.6 23.4 Mostly successful
Bantul Downstream 52 Yes Constant 15.6 19.9 Mostly unsuccessful
Sleman Upstream 43 Yes Constant 20.4 12.9 Limited success
*Data drawn from respective district irrigation oﬃces.
**Data from BPS (2013).
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One farmer leader recalled his words at the meeting: ‘‘Don’t be
afraid to talk to farmers about their jobs. I know don’t know
as much about farming as they do, so I ask. You can ask them.
I consult [farmer name]” (personal communication, August
12, 2011). Both farmers and irrigation oﬃcials explained that
the political support has proved vital to the development and
growth of Kulon Progo’s WUA. In contrast, oﬃcials and
farmers in both Bantul and Sleman had little to say regarding
the role of the district government in encouraging WUA devel-
opment.
(d) Discussion
In these comparisons, then, it appears that political pressure
facing local politicians was a major causal factor leading to
Kulon Progo’s relative success in promoting WUA. This pres-
sure was experienced through elections where promoting agri-
culture was a major issue, informal contacts from social
networks, and lobbying by GP3A groups. When local politi-
cians felt pressure to be responsive to farmer needs, they in
turn cajoled and supported irrigation and agriculture oﬃcials
to work closely with farmers in developing these organizations
(see Lewis, 2014; von Luebke, 2009). This resulted in a rela-
tively high proportion of WUA becoming eﬀective.
The political stress placed on district leaders in Kulon Progo
on irrigation issues has contributed to WUA development. In
contrast, the lack of pressure in irrigation issues led Bantul’s
government to place low priority on creating and promoting
eﬀective WUA. In Sleman low political salience of agriculture
translated into poor performance in WUA promotion, with
the important exception of the P3A training program, which
grew out of the eﬀorts of an individual irrigation oﬃcial. Its
eﬀect, though, was limited as the rest of the agency failed to
adopt the program. This is discussed in more detail in the next
section.
This evidence suggests a few implications. First, in line with
some of claims in the decentralization literature, pressure
placed on local politicians can yield positive beneﬁts
(Aspinall, 2014; Faguet, 2004). Bureaucrats in Kulon Progo
engaged eﬀectively with farmer organizations. This was in
large part due to a long relationship that the agency had work-
ing with farmers, 8 but it was also developed in response to
compulsion district-level politicians felt in agriculture issues.
These local politicians realized that their agriculture-based
constituencies were concerned about irrigation. The district
head also knew, thanks to personal and political ties with
farmer leaders, that he needed to pay attention to farmer
demands. Because of this, he placed extra pressure and
encouragement on local civil servants to work with farmers.
He, and the local legislature, have also provided monetary
support for the GP3A organizations, as well as provided for-
ums for complaints. Thus the local political context con-
tributed to the successful implementation of policy.
Second, resource shortages are important, but they alone
are insuﬃcient. The same holds for central government man-
dates for participatory management. Bureaucrats in all three
locations experienced resource shortages. They were also leg-
ally charged with developing participatory organizations,
especially in the years 1999–2006. Despite this pressure, only
bureaucrats in one of the three districts engaged in WUA
development. The remaining two districts carried out pro-
grams from the central government, but these programs failed
to result in an eﬀective relationship between farmer leaders
and bureaucrats. They also failed to inculcate a commitment
in farmers’ minds to the WUA. This led to frustration on both
sides, as district civil servants complained that farmers were
unwilling and unable to engage in participatory irrigation
management. Farmers complained that they were not truly
being included in a participatory process. One farmer leader
comically criticized the government’s repeated eﬀorts to
induce participation through training programs, ‘‘the longer
we are trained, the stupider we get (makin lama makin bodoh)”
(personal communication, Bantul, April 27, 2011).
Incentives of local irrigation oﬃcials, at least in Sleman and
Bantul, were not geared toward synergistic relationships with
farmers. They, instead, focused on implementing rather diri-
giste programs from the central government. Resource short-
ages coupled with policy mandates alone do not innovation
make.
6. WUA SURVEY RESULTS
I now turn to test the eﬃcacy of state eﬀorts to promote
WUA and better understand how agency–farmer interactions
shaped participation. I do this through an original survey of
P3A conducted in a single district, Sleman, wherein my unit
of analysis is the P3A. In this section, I ﬁrst discuss the choice
of Sleman for the survey. Then I explain how I measured my
dependent variable, WUA activity. I also brieﬂy discuss the
independent and control variables in the survey before pre-
senting the results of my analysis. Finally, I conclude the sec-
tion with the implications of these results.
My use of surveys and quantitative analysis suﬀers from a
potential limitation in that it simpliﬁes complex human inter-
actions; thus statistical results may overlook or mask impor-
tant contributing factors in the causal story. Being aware of
this potential drawback, the discussion section below supple-
ments these results with data drawn from interviews and ﬁeld
research. By combining the two, I provide a clearer picture of
the eﬀect of state eﬀorts to strengthen WUA.
(a) WUA training in Sleman
As noted above, Sleman district has the unique fortune of
being home to a string of relatively successful P3A organiza-
tions, at least in terms of placement in the yearly national con-
test. Every winner of the provincial P3A contest from 2007
through 2011 was drawn from Sleman district, and those
which won went on to place well in the national contest. 9
Even so, the vast majority of the WUA in Sleman were rela-
tively inactive. Most of the active groups have been recipients
of a recent training program of the irrigation agency.
The district oﬃcial who developed the program explained
the impetus of the scheme: ‘‘We are low on manpower. . .
We can’t keep doing our jobs without the resources. . . so we
have to turn to the farmers” (personal communication, Sle-
man April 7, 2011). Oﬃcials hoped that by training farmers
to better manage their systems, the agency would be able to
continue oﬀering the same level of service provision with fewer
employees. Training included multiple meetings with farmer
leaders to instruct them on the legal capacity of WUA, orga-
nizational structure, how to write and implement rules, basic
knowledge about infrastructure design and construction, and
how to better access assistance from the irrigation agency.
Outcomes of training meetings included establishing a leader-
ship structure, drafting organizational rules, and creating a
cropping plan. The training program continued from 2006
through 2010 when the irrigation agency shifted their focus
from P3A to GP3A due to implementation of Law 38/2008,
which transferred responsibility over the smaller organizations
to the agriculture agency. Unfortunately, agriculture oﬃcials
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in many areas across Indonesia were poorly equipped and less
than enthusiastic to adopt programs working with P3A. 10 As
such, at the time of ﬁeld visits and the survey, the irrigation
agency no longer had the authority, and more importantly
the budget, to facilitate the groups while the agriculture
agency had yet to embrace its new responsibility over basic
water user groups.
This provided an excellent opportunity to test the program’s
eﬀectiveness. Anecdotally the irrigation agency’s eﬀorts
seemed successful, but oﬃcials had yet to carry out any sys-
tematic evaluation of the WUA. With only 45 groups having
received training, I could survey most of these organizations
as well as a relatively similar number of groups which had
not received the same training. In all, 92 WUA provided valid
survey responses. 35 of them had taken part in the recent
training program, while 57 had not. Among those which had
not been a part of the training program, 22 groups reported
having been trained at an earlier period. 35 groups stated that
they had received no substantive irrigation agency training.
(b) Measuring WUA activity
I ﬁrst needed to gauge the success level of individual P3A.
The survey allowed me greater leverage to apply a standard
measure of eﬀectiveness across a broad variety of groups
than the earlier qualitative study. Here I posed a series of
questions related to seven indicators of WUA activity found
in the literature (Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; Mukherji
et al., 2009). Three of these questions were directed at the
same indicators of group success as in the qualitative com-
parisons: irrigation service fee collection, conﬂict manage-
ment, and water sharing. These questions were
supplemented with four other indicators. These included
whether the group independently maintained the canals in
their system, whether the group coordinated cropping pat-
terns, and whether the organization had a set of written
rules. I also included a self-evaluation in which the group lea-
der declared whether or not he felt the group was active.
Each of these responses was coded into a binary variable,
with a one reﬂecting a positive response.
In order to measure the underlying latent variable, water
user group activity, I conducted a factor analysis based on
these seven indicators. The resulting predicted latent variable
is labeled WUA Activity, which serves as my dependent vari-
able in the following analysis. 11 Summary statistics of all vari-
ables can be found in Table 2.
(c) Independent variables
I used three variables to measure the eﬀorts of the state to
promote WUA. The ﬁrst was a binary variable indicating
whether or not the group had been part of the training pro-
gram conducted in the district from 2006 through 2010. The
second was another binary variable indicating that the P3A
had taken part in earlier training programs but not those con-
ducted after 2006. Some of the groups which had earlier train-
ing also took part in the later training program, but I removed
these from this measure. This variable, then, captures only
those groups which had been trained exclusively prior to
2006. If training programs are eﬀective, then we should see
that these variables have positive relationships with WUA
activity. A third variable was also used, which indicated the
frequency of contact that the group had with irrigation
oﬃcials. This was a categorical variable with increasing fre-
quency, from less than once a year to regular monthly contact.
Frequency of contact was not coterminous with training, but it
allowed me to measure the strength of the relationship
between irrigation oﬃcials and the WUA. I expected that this
relationship should be positively related to group activity, fol-
lowing the theoretical predictions discussed above (Lam, 1996;
Tendler, 1997).
Drawing on Agrawal (2003), I included set of control vari-
ables which could have an eﬀect on collective action. First, I
included continuous measures of group size, gauged by both
land area (in hectares) and membership numbers. From these
numbers, we can see that the size of P3A in my sample
ranged from 10 farmers to just over 600 farmers, with an
average membership of 72 farmers. Area-wise, the groups ran-
ged from four hectares to 180 hectares, with an average size of
just under 37 hectares. This is about six hectares smaller than
Table 2. Summary statistics
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables*
Do you consider the WUA as active? 90 0.833 0.375 0 1
Does the P3A regularly clean canals? 91 0.923 0.268 0 1
Does the P3A coordinate cropping patterns? 90 0.267 0.445 0 1
Does the P3A manage water rotation and sharing? 91 0.835 0.373 0 1
Do at least 70% of P3A members pay water fees? 85 0.424 0.497 0 1
Is the P3A able to manage farmer conﬂicts? 90 0.944 0.230 0 1
Does the P3A have written rules? 89 0.517 0.503 0 1
WUA Activity (predicted latent variable) 80 0 0.739 1.69 0.987
Training variables
Training (2006–10) 92 0.380 0.488 0 1
Other training (pre-2006) 92 0.239 0.429 0 1
Frequency of contact with irrigation oﬃcials 90 3.10 1.218 1 5
Controls
Area 91 36.984 28.921 4 180
Membership numbers 90 72.289 82.522 10 603
Geography 87 0.713 0.455 0 1
Crop type 90 0.200 0.402 0 1
Water scarcity 89 1.292 0.527 1 4
*These questions have been simpliﬁed to ﬁt this table. Actual survey questions varied slightly.
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the average P3A group size reported in Table 1. I expect that
these variables would be negatively related to WUA
activity, as smaller groups should mobilize more easily
(Olson, 1965).
Second, a geographic variable indicates whether the group
is located on the mountainside or on the lowlands. This was
a binary measure; groups in mountainous terrain scored a
zero, while those on the plains or lowlands scored a one.
The average score for this variable (0.713) indicates that
the majority of the groups surveyed were located on the
plains. I expect a negative sign from this variable, as Sleman
is an upstream district and relatively water-rich. Thus, farm-
ers on the plains have little need for collective action. In con-
trast, mountainous environments require collective action to
reduce water losses from run-oﬀ, thus farmer groups would
have greater incentives for collective action (Lam, 1996;
Lansing, 2007).
I also included a measure of the types of crops cultivated by
the group in order to gain information about the homogeneity
of group interests. This was a binary measure, with a one indi-
cating that the group relied exclusively on rice. A group receiv-
ing a zero score cultivated a mixture of crops, which in many
cases included rice. The average score (0.200) indicates that
most of the groups surveyed had a mixed cropping proﬁle.
Relatively few of the groups cultivated rice exclusively. I have
no clear expectation about the eﬀect of this variable, although
we know that divergent interests may make collective action
more diﬃcult (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). On the other hand,
mixing crops may give farmers a greater incentive to coordi-
nate cropping patterns and water sharing.
Water scarcity was the last control variable. This was a cat-
egorical variable wherein the P3A reported the amount of
water available, lower values indicated abundant water and
higher values indicated water scarcity. Here, the average score
is 1.292 meaning that the P3A surveyed generally have suﬃ-
cient access to water. I am agnostic as to the expected eﬀect
of this variable, as many scholars have found cooperation is
diﬃcult in both situations of extreme water scarcity and
extreme water abundance (Agrawal, 2002; Bardhan, 1993a).
Thus the eﬀect may be curvilinear (Araral, 2009).
(d) Findings and discussion
On order to assess the eﬀect of training on group activity, I
ran ﬁve regression models using these data to test the eﬀects of
the three independent variables of interest. In the ﬁrst model, I
included all three independent variables as well as the control
variables. The second model removed the control variables.
The last three models include all the control variables but tests
each one of the training measures independently in order to
separate out their eﬀects. The linear regression results can be
found in Table 3.
The regression results present a few interesting ﬁndings,
which are summarized in Table 4. Initially we can see that only
two of the control variables have signiﬁcant eﬀects. In the sam-
ple it appears that groups located in the plains are less active
than their counterparts in mountainous terrain. This follows
with the logic noted above that the steep slopes require more
frequent collective action among farmer groups in order to
prevent a loss of fast-ﬂowing water. Additionally, groups
which engage in mono-cropping rice are less active than those
which cultivate a wider variety of crops. This eﬀect is likely
due to the fact that mixed cropping patterns require better
coordination regarding water distribution. The eﬀect may also
emerge from the fact that those who monocrop rice are in
areas that have abundant water, which means they have little
impetus to coordinate. Water Scarcity, which maintained a
consistently positive sign, albeit not statistically signiﬁcant,
oﬀers some weak support for this supposition, but the
conclusion is subject to further testing. The other control
variables do not appear to be signiﬁcantly correlated with
WUA Activity.
Table 3. Regression results on WUA activity
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E
Training (2006–10) 0.030
(0.168)
0.090
(0.193)
0.287*
(0.144)
Other training (pre 2006) 0.180
(0.201)
0.433**
(0.199)
0.204
(0.198)
Frequency of contact 0.200***
(0.067)
0.228***
(0.074)
0.200***
(0.058)
Area 0.001
(0.003)
0.002
(0.004)
0.003
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
Membership size 0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
Geography 0.366**
(0.161)
0.413**
(0.162)
0.449***
(0.162)
0.374**
(0.158)
Crop type 0.499**
(0.210)
0.570**
(0.226)
0.474**
(0.231)
0.566***
(0.195)
Water scarcity 0.085
(0.122)
0.005
(0.150)
0.058
(0.154)
0.094
(0.120)
Constant 0.210
(0.278)
0.651**
(0.245)
0.349
(0.227)
0.409
(0.242)
0.266
(0.275)
N 71 79 72 72 71
R-squared 0.399 0.231 0.315 0.297 0.390
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Moving on to the variables of interest, we can see that the
two training variables did not seem to have as strong an eﬀect
as one might have hoped. While in Model C, we did see a sig-
niﬁcantly positive eﬀect from taking part in the recent training
program (2006–10), this eﬀect disappears when paired with
other measures of training. The positive result is heartening,
in that it seems to support the idea that training can be
beneﬁcial (Ricks & Arif, 2012). Even so, the relationship
between training and WUA activity is weaker than that found
among other variables, and its direction was reversed in other
models.
On the other hand, in Model B we see that having been
trained before 2006 actually has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect
on WUA activity, contrary to expectations. The signiﬁcance
disappears in other models, but the eﬀect remains negative.
This result, though, is in harmony to some of the ﬁndings from
ﬁeld visits. For instance, leaders in one WUA, which been part
of a training program many years previous, explained that the
organization was established at the behest of the government.
Their training had only involved the establishment of the
group and writing a basic set of group rules. Since that time,
they had received relatively little support from irrigation oﬃ-
cials. The farmer leaders related that they saw very little need
for a WUA and that it existed primarily on paper. They only
used the group name on rare occasions when ﬁling paperwork
with the irrigation department. When I asked them their feel-
ings regarding the switch of authority over P3A from the irri-
gation department to the agriculture department that had
occurred three years previous, the farmers had not yet heard
of the transfer, indicating the lack of contact which they expe-
rienced with irrigation department personnel (farmer leaders,
personal communication, June 24, 2011). The farmers also
seemed to harbor feelings of resentment or distrust toward
the irrigation agency as they felt the training programs were
only conducted to serve oﬃcials’ needs rather than those of
farmers. The early training program was thus ineﬀective and
perhaps even counterproductive.
In contrast, frequent contact between irrigation oﬃcials and
the WUA has a strong positive eﬀect on a group’s level of
activity. This relationship held strong across all three models
that included the variable. Frequent contact between irriga-
tion oﬃcials and the WUA became the single most signiﬁcant
predictor of group activity out of any of the variables in the
analysis. The substantive eﬀect can be seen in the scatterplot
drawn from Model A in Figure 1. Here the predicted values
of WUA Activity for each of the P3A are plotted according
to their level of contact with irrigation oﬃcials; a line of best
ﬁt has also been drawn through the data. This graphically rep-
resents the ﬁnding that if a group is contacted at least every
few months by state oﬃcials, the WUA is much more likely
to be active than those which receive only semi-annual or
yearly contact.
What do these results mean for the eﬀect of state eﬀorts to
promote WUA? Training programs are often not eﬀective at
building WUA. Even among well-intentioned projects, train-
ing does not build the close relationships necessary for
farmer–agency interaction. Indeed, one-oﬀ training projects
may actually be detrimental to the relationship between farm-
ers and the agency, as farmers feel that they are being used or
patronized rather than becoming equal partners in manage-
ment.
Short-term training programs tend to focus on making the
organizations legible to the state, which in this case meant
establishing a formal set of rules. These rules may not always
be enforced, even in relatively successful groups (farmer lead-
ers, personal communication, Sleman June 24, 2011; ﬁeld
Figure 1. The eﬀect of frequency of contact on WUA activity.
Table 4. Expected and observed coeﬃcient signs of independent variables
Independent variable Expected sign Observed sign
Variables of interest
Training (2006–10) Positive Mixed
Other Training (pre 2006) Positive Negative*
Frequency of Contact Positive Positive**
Controls
Area Negative Positive
Membership size Negative Negative
Geography Negative Negative**
Crop type No Prediction Negative**
Water scarcity No Prediction Positive
‘‘Mixed” indicates that the variables had diﬀerent signs in diﬀerent models.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.05 level in one model.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at 0.05 level in multiple models.
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notes, GP3A leadership meeting, Kulon Progo August 10,
2011), but their existence legitimizes groups in the eyes of
the state. This holds true not only for Sleman, but all three dis-
tricts under consideration. In one case, a GP3A which was
being considered for the provincial contest had a strong set
of rules, but during an interview, a farmer leader confessed,
‘‘we have rules. . . but they are not enforced (tidak jalan)” (per-
sonal communication, Bantul April 27, 2011). Rule books are
a way that irrigation oﬃcials are able to report to their agen-
cies that they have implemented a participatory policy, a strat-
egy hearkening back to implementation of the 1987 policy
(Bruns, 2004). Reﬂecting the perennial appeal of this
approach, oﬃcials within the agriculture agency who were
now in charge of developing the P3A claimed that their main
focus for WUA promotion was to record a body of laws for
each group (agriculture oﬃcial, personal communication, Sle-
man, June 22, 2011). Thus, the institutions which emerge from
training programs are often reﬂections of incentive structures
within the agencies rather than the organizations farmers
need.
Instead of training programs, regular contact between irri-
gation oﬃcials and farmer leaders serves as a more eﬀective
way to build strong WUA (Lam, 1996; Wade, 1992). Again,
the qualitative ﬁeld visits provide an indication as to why this
matters. Regular interaction between irrigation oﬃcials and
farmers reduced the transaction costs for information sharing.
When irrigation oﬃcials frequently meet with farmers, they
create an opportunity to exchange knowledge with farmers.
Such information ﬂows convince farmers of the utility of the
groups. They also facilitate the eﬀorts of the irrigation depart-
ment, as they are able to gather greater site-speciﬁc informa-
tion more eﬃciently than through their own observations.
Active groups reported that irrigation oﬃcials and agriculture
extension agents regularly attended their group meetings (ﬁeld
notes, Sleman, May 27, 2011; communication with irrigation
oﬃcial, Sleman, June 9, 2011). In fact, in Kulon Progo where
farmer groups are the most active among the three districts
considered here, irrigation oﬃcials hold a meeting with
GP3A group leaders as well as representatives from the agri-
culture agency and the regional planning agency at least twice
a month (irrigation oﬃcial, personal communication, Kulon
Progo, May 10, 2011). This frequent meeting was seen as
key to the close relationship between farmer groups and the
irrigation agency. Regular contact with state oﬃcials provides
both the incentives and the tools to farmers to develop an
active organization which beneﬁts all involved.
7. CONCLUSIONS
These ﬁndings provide important insights about how local
conditions shape the implementation of participatory policies.
First, drawing on an original survey of 92 WUA, we see that
the frequency of contact between state oﬃcials and farmer
groups is much more important for the success of the group
than training programs. Qualitative interviews complemented
this ﬁnding. This result challenges the use of training programs
to promote local organizations for participatory management,
a common strategy in many developing countries (Geijer,
Porton, & Smith, 1994; Mansuri & Rao, 2013). The data even
suggested that some training eﬀorts have been counterproduc-
tive. Without regular contact between oﬃcials and service
recipients, eﬀorts to implement participatory policies based
on training programs will be of little or ﬂeeting eﬀect. This
highlights the importance of socially embedded street-level
oﬃcials both in irrigation (Lam, 1996, 2001; Oorthuizen,
2003; Suhardiman & Giordano, 2014; van der Zaag, 1992;
Wade, 1992) and in other sectors (Edmonds, 2002; Evans,
1995; Tendler, 1997). Beyond this, the ﬁnding provides empir-
ical support for Suhardiman and Giordano’s (2014) recent call
for greater focus on farmer–agency interactions. Frequent
contact between oﬃcials and farmer groups does appear to
improve participatory outcomes.
Second, we see the important role of local politics in deter-
mining the success of participatory policies. While bureaucra-
cies can often encompass negative incentives that hinder close
ties between oﬃcials and service recipients (Lam, 1998; Molle
et al., 2009; Ricks, 2015), those negative incentives can be
overcome through local political conditions (see also Bruns,
2013). These ﬁndings show that participatory policy imple-
mentation, especially in decentralized systems (von Luebke,
2009), is a dynamic aﬀair. Farmers in Kulon Progo were able
to demand assistance from the district chief due to the local
importance of agriculture as well as social and political ties.
The district chief, in turn, backed the development of WUA
through providing ﬁnancial support to the groups as well as
pressuring state oﬃcials to be responsive to farmers. In con-
trast, in both Bantul and Sleman districts, local governments
felt little demand from farmer groups and thus placed little
emphasis on developing participatory irrigation management
institutions. This allowed the irrigation agency to follow its
own internal initiatives. These ﬁndings demonstrate that,
under the right political context, farmer groups are able to
aﬀect policy implementation and service delivery (Mollinga
& Bolding, 2004; Rosser et al., 2011). While at the national
level these appeals may be diluted (Suhardiman, 2015), I sug-
gest that local-level demands from service recipients should be
an important consideration in our examination of participa-
tory policies. Researchers should be aware of the potential
for local mobilization and engagement during the policy
implementation process.
Of course, the data here is drawn from a limited geographic
region in Indonesia. The generalizability of these lessons,
therefore, remains contingent on further testing. Even so,
these ﬁndings demonstrate that the state can create active
WUA, suggesting the success of participatory organizations
for common pool resource management may have less to do
with whether they are top-down or bottom-up and more to
do with the local context and politics of implementation, espe-
cially in decentralized systems (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984).
Unfortunately, political contexts like those found in Kulon
Progo, where demand from service recipients helps drive pol-
icy implementation, are relatively rare (Ricks, 2015; Winters
et al., 2014). This has a rather sobering implication that we
might expect participatory policies to repeatedly fail except
in extraordinary cases where the ambitions of a local politician
align with the goals of the policy. Relying on such sporadic
success does not make for satisfying outcomes.
As such, these ﬁndings imply that one of the major chal-
lenges in participatory management is changing the way that
state agencies monitor, evaluate, and reward the actions of
their street-level oﬃcials. Rather than ﬁxate on budget cycles
and easily measured results, such as how many groups have
a written body of rules, incentives must be developed for
bureaucrats to engage with the intangible aspects of institu-
tional development. Policy makers and oﬃcials in irrigation
agencies would be better served by focusing less on a project
or program-based approach with speciﬁc start and end dates
and concentrating more on encouraging their local oﬃcials
to meet with farmer groups regularly. An awareness of the role
of frequent contact on WUA success can serve to increase the
eﬀectiveness of participatory policies.
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NOTES
1. Increasingly scholars are highlighting the politics of national participa-
tory policies, showing that politicians have relatively few incentives to shape
these policies to reﬂect the needs of farmers. Suhardiman (2013, 2015) and
Bruns (2004) have both emphasized this point in relation to Indonesia.
Scholars have similarly highlighted these issues in Mexico (Rap, 2006),
Nepal (Lam, 1998), India (Mosse, 2003), and the Philippines (Araral, 2005),
among others (Mollinga & Bolding, 2004; Suhardiman et al., 2014).
2. While the decentralization process resulted in some early concerns that
district-level accountability would be lost due to corruption (Aspinall &
Fealy, 2003; Hadiz, 2004), recent work by Aspinall (2014), Kis-Katos and
Sjahrir (2013), Lewis (2014), Rosser, Wilson, and Sulistiyanto (2011), and
von Luebke (2009) has demonstrated that vertical accountability
mechanisms are become increasingly important in determining service
provision at the district level in Indonesia, and ‘‘voters are now more
powerful than at any other time in Indonesian history” (Buehlher, 2010,
pp. 273). Lewis (2014) further argued that the reason for continued poor
service delivery is not one of a lack of accountability but instead a lack of
citizen demand in key sectors (see also Winters et al., 2014). Pairing these
arguments with my own ﬁeld observations, I contend, despite the presence
of corruption, district heads who experience pressure from citizen groups
do respond with policy shifts.
3. The 2004 Law was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional
Court in February 2015, reinstating the prior 1974 law.
4. World Bank WISMP appraisals were based on 18 key indicators, with
six related to participation in irrigation management including: the
number of integrated water user groups (GP3A) that had been legally
established in each project area; the amount of contributions to system
maintenance drawn from farmer irrigation fees; women’s participation;
transfer of tasks to water user groups; training of district irrigation
departments; and sustainability of operations and maintenance budgets.
World Bank documents, though, state that evaluations of WUA were
primarily qualitative in nature, ‘‘due to lack of systematic monitoring and
evaluation data” (World Bank, 2012, pp. 18).
5. The most recent nation-wide evaluation of WUA occurred in 2004,
but irrigation oﬃcials in Jakarta hesitate to use the data, as they do not
believe it is accurate. They complained that data collection eﬀorts were
diﬃcult, and many districts and provinces either failed to report
information or provided only partial information. In private communi-
cations, the oﬃcials also admitted that, dependent on the province, much
of the data were likely falsiﬁed.
6. Previously there had been 13 GP3A, but some of the organizations
recently merged.
7. In evaluations, I only rely on my four indicators. For instance, even
thoughKulon Progowas relatively successful, the district’sWUA still faced
multiple challenges, including poor ﬁnancial practices, disconnects between
some farmers andWUA leadership, conﬂicts between P3A and GP3A over
funding, weak coordination between GP3A, and continued reliance on the
irrigation agency. For more details on the situation in Kulon Progo in the
years prior to my research, see Chapter 7 of Suhardiman (2015).
8. This has some similarity to the ﬁndings of Oorthuizen (2003) in the
Philippines and van der Zaag (1992) in Mexico.
9. In theory, the national contest involves standardized scores for eachWUA
in the country onorganization, administration, ﬁnances, technicalmatters, and
agricultural production. In practice, relatively few organizations are evaluated
due to time and budget constraints. Evaluations tend to emphasize a close
relationship with irrigation oﬃcials as well as formal aspects of the organiza-
tion, such as written rules and irrigation service fee collection.
10. This was consistent across all three districts discussed here. P3A in
other areas also complained that the agriculture agency was unprepared to
work with them (see Tribun Lampung, 2013).
11. Factor analysis of the seven indicators resulted in only one factor
with an eigenvalue greater than one, which also accounted for 77.5% of the
variance of the indicators. Applying the Kaiser rule, I kept the single
factor. Using this statistic, I created a predicted latent variable. As
predicted variables are continuous and unbounded, they also include
negative numbers. This does not mean that WUA Activity was negative; it
merely serves as a continuous statistic across a range of activity levels. As
an alternate measure, I repeated this analysis using an index variable
created from the seven indicators. The results diﬀered in relation to only
the Crop Type variable, which lost its signiﬁcance across all models.
Otherwise the results were consistent with those presented here. Results
are available from the author upon request.
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